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Canada's Foreign Investment Review
Act and the Problem of Industrial
Policy
James M. Spence, Q.C.*
The purpose of this article is to consider the Foreign Investment Review Act
(FIRA or the Act) I of Canada in the context of the continuing discussion in North
America of the concept of "industrial policy." The particular version of indus-
trial policy of interest for this purpose is the concept which involves interven-
tionist activity by the government designed to affect directly the economic
activity of an industry, company, or plant. 2 The first part of the article briefly
describes the background and operation of FIRA. The second part comments on
the concept of interventionist industrial policy as it has developed in Canada.
Following this background, the article considers various aspects of FIRA as a
vehicle for the formulation and implementation of industrial policy, In part III, a
method of approach is suggested for dealing with two questions: the effectiveness
of FIRA as an institution to implement foreign investment industrial policy, and
the potential of FIRA as a model for a larger industrial policy institution.
I. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT:
ITS BACKGROUND AND OPERATION
FIRA came into force in 1974. In general terms, the Act provides that no
foreign person or foreign-controlled enterprise is permitted to take over an exist-
ing Canadian business, or to establish a new and unrelated Canadian business,
without receiving the approval of the Government of Canada. Underlying this far-
reaching legislative initiative was an increasing concern in many quarters
* Partner, Tory, Tory, DesLauriers & Binnington, Toronto, Canada. Senior Legal Advisor, Foreign
Investment Review Agency, 1975-1976. B.A. 1962, University of Toronto; LL.B. 1966, University
of Toronto.
1. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, 1973-74 Can. Stat. 619, amended by ch. 52, § 128(2),
1976-77 Can. Stat. 1266, and ch. 107, § 63, 1980-81-82 Can. Stat. 3131. [hereinafter cited as
FIRA]. This article was prepared prior to the Canadian federal general election held in September of
1984. For a description of the important changes relating to FIRA which have occurred since that
election, see infra note 56.
2. This definition is suggested in P. Davenport, Industrial Policy in Ontario and Quebec 1 (Feb. 23,
1982) (discussion paper presented for the Economic Council of Canada).
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throughout Canada that the high level of foreign investment in the Canadian
economy and foreign control over large elements of the Canadian economy
carried real and significant disadvantages, in addition to significant benefits. The
disadvantages generally were considered to lie in the phenomenon of the "trun-
cated" enterprise; that is, a Canadian subsidiary established by a foreign multina-
tional parent corporation to serve only the very limited Canadian market and
unable to develop technology, know-how, or other capabilities necessary to en-
able it to compete effectively in export markets. Of similar concern was the belief
that the high level of foreign investment could shift the development of the
Canadian economy away from the direction most beneficial to Canadians. This
concern was seen to be exemplified by the fact that Canada's resource sector was
far more developed than its manufacturing sector.3
These concerns are reflected in the criteria which the Cabinet is required to
take into account in assessing FIRA applications. The five factors enumerated in
the Act are as follows:
(a) the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in
Canada, including employment, resource processing, utilization of parts, compo-
nents and services produced in Canada, and exports from Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business and its
industry;
(c) the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological
development, product innovation and product variety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the investment on competition; and
(e) the compatibility of the investment with national, industrial and economic
policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy objectives enun-
ciated by any province likely to be significantly affected.
4
The Minister responsible for the Act is the Minister of Industry, Trade and
Commerce (the Minister). The Act also provides for the establishment of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency (the Agency) to advise and assist in connec-
tion with the administration of the Act.
Various enforcement provisions are contained in the Act. One of these pro-
vides that the government may seek a court order to "render nugatory" an
investment made in contravention of the Act. This could include an order prohib-
iting the exercise of voting rights on shares, or an order requiring the divestiture
of shares or property.5
In practice, the review procedure under the Act works in the following way.
The Assessment Branch of the Agency reviews the application and consults with
the provinces significantly affected by the investment, and also with those federal
government departments whose views can be expected to be relevant. 6 Through
this procedure, the Agency develops a preliminary view of the application and
3. See INFORMATION CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972).
4. FIRA, supra note 1, at § 2(2).
5. Id. at §§ 19-20.
6. However, the Act prescribes definite rules of confidentiality with respect to information submit-
ted by the applicant. See FIRA, supra note 1, at § 14.
CANADA 135
then consults with the applicant to consider the matter further. The Agency may
believe, for example, that the application has certain weaknesses that make
government approval questionable. In such a case, the Assessment officers will
consult with the applicant about possible improvements in the plans. In other
cases, the officers may look for a more detailed statement as to some part of the
plans only generally described in the application. In order to confirm their plans,
applicants frequently undertake to own and carry on the business in a particular
manner. For example, there may be an undertaking to provide prospective Cana-
dian suppliers with an equal opportunity to bid on the enterprise's requirements
for raw materials and services. When the Agency has formulated a recommenda-
tion, it is submitted to the Minister for his consideration. Once the Minister is
satisfied with it, the recommendation goes forward to the Cabinet.7 Under the
Act, the Cabinet is required to allow the investment only if it determines that it
"is or is likely to be of significant benefit to Canada." Otherwise, the Cabinet
must disallow the investment.
8
The Agency regularly publishes information on investment proposals approved
under the Act. This includes identification of the categories or headings under
which prospective benefit has been identified. Usually the published information
is without details of the expected benefit reflected in the plans or undertakings. In
some cases, however, the applicant gives permission to release this information.
These reports provide valuable insight into the types of consideration that have
operated in particular cases. 9 The Agency published a statement of the highlights
of the Annual Report of 1982-83, in which it described the results for that fiscal
year as follows:
During the fiscal year just completed, the value of planned new investment in
allowed cases rose more than 89% over 1981-82 levels, to more than $3 billion. In
addition, 25,545 jobs were expected to be created and 5,670 to be saved in cases
allowed in 1982-83, an overall increase of 61% over 1981-82.0
7. FIRA, supra note 1, at § 10.
8. Id. at § 12.
9. For example, the proposal by Soprema, S.A. of Strasbourg, France, to establish a new business
in Quebec to manufacture and distribute specialized heavy-duty roofing products was approved. The
Annual Report under the Act comments on that proposal as follows:
In addition to introducing new technology to Canada, Soprema's investment is expected to
bring a number of other benefits to Canada. For example, Soprema undertook to invest $1
million in the acquisition of land and buildings and an additional $1 million in the purchase of
machinery and equipment in Canada. Soprema will create 25 new jobs during the first two
years of activity if a projected sales volume is reached, will train employees in France, and
will bring its French technical experts to Canada to train Canadian personnel in the manufac-
ture and installation of Soprema's roofing products. Soprema also undertook to provide the
new business unrestricted and exclusive access to the applicant's technology and know-how,
and to establish a product development laboratory in Canada. The day-to-day management of
the new business will be in the hands of Canadians.
GOV'T OF CANADA, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AcT ANNUAL REPORT 1982-83, at 4 (1983).
10. Foreign Inv. Review Agency, Gov't of Canada, Release No. F-40, at 29 (Sept. 30, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Release No. F-40].
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II. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN CANADA
Over the past couple of years or so, the idea of an "industrial policy" has
apparently become a subject of ever-increasing comment in the United States.
As one writer has put it, it would appear that "all God's chill'un want indus-
trial policy." II The version of industrial policy usually discussed is the "boost
the winners, forget (or restructure) the losers" approach. The following is one
description of the approach:
What people who talk about 'industrial policy' mean, if they mean anything at all
(and some don't), is a new level of intervention by the government in the econ-
omy-basically, attempts by government to guide the fate of particular industries.
These people say it's not enough for the government to worry about the size of the
budget deficit or the money supply, and about general incentives for saving and
investment. Instead, the government must be prepared to roll up its sleeves and get
its hands dirty promoting or discouraging particular industries, or even particular
firms. Most industrial policies involve some scheme for government investment in
America's faltering 'basic industries' (steel, rubber, machine tools) in exchange for
a government role in 'restructuring' those industries. Most also involve an attempt
to boost the high-technology 'sunrise' industries (semi-conductors and the like) that
are said to populate our future. 12
There are certainly some parallels between the recent U.S. discussion of
industrial policy and the Canadian debate. One principal difference is that the
Canadian debate has been going on far longer, since at least the early 1970s. The
following description identifies the factors that were at work over the past two
decades, leading to Canadian concerns about the need for an industrial policy for
Canada:
By the early Seventies . . . observers began to feel that Canadian optimism about
the country's economic future bordered on complacency. Basic social and economic
changes in Canada and in its principal trading partner, the United States, dramat-
ically undermined Canada's traditional approach to economic policy. These
changes affected the resource sector and, most significantly, the manufacturing
sector...
As a result of these pressures, the late Sixties and early Seventies saw a general
recognition that inelasticity of supply factors, and other costly developments, re-
quired a much more careful and considered allocation of resources. New and more
I1. Kaus, Can Creeping Socialism Cure Creaking Capitalism?, HARPER'S, Feb. 1983, at 17. On
industrial policy in the United States, see, for example, Rohatyn, The State of the Banks, N. Y. REV.
BOOKS, Nov. 4, 1982, at 3, 8 (includes a call for the "creation of a modem version of the federal
Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the 1930s") and R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER
275-76 (1983) (calling for "[Piolitical institutions capable of generating large-scale compromise and
adaptation . . , [and] a national bargaining arena for allocating the burdens and benefits of major
adjustment strategies .... It would enable government, business, and labor to fashion explicit
agreements to restructure American industry.") For an example of the criticisms of the call for an
industrial policy, see Stein, Don't Fall for Industrial Policy, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 1983 at 64, 74 ("In
principle, industrial policy might contribute to economic growth if it fostered the movement of labor
and capital to more productive and progressive industries. But in practice the Corporate-Union
Welfare State would almost certainly do the opposite.")
12. Kaus, supra note 11, at 17.
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complex kinds of decisions were necessary to minimize, for example, foreign debt
and foreign investment, to economize on expensive and finite natural resources, and
to distribute development to underdeveloped regions. The objectives and criteria in
forming such choices would according to some observers be the essential elements
of an industrial strategy. For example, the Gray Report on foreign direct investment
in Canada referred repeatedly to the need for an industrial strategy for Canada, to
guide the decisions of the screening agency which it recommended to regulate new
foreign investment. Furthermore, commercial and exchange policies would be
amongst the instruments of such a larger strategy as would additional micro-
economic policies focused on particular supply factors other than foreign capital. 11
Despite the perceptions of the early Seventies, no such far-reaching industrial
strategy has ever been formulated and implemented in Canada. One factor stand-
ing in the way of the formulation of any such policy has been said to be the
problem of regional diversity in Canada. 14 The importance of federal political
and bureaucratic opposition has also been noted. 15
13. R. FRENCH, How OrTAWA DECIDES 93-94 (1980). The Gray Report discussed in French's
description is the report of a working group on foreign investment policy established by the Govern-
ment of Canada and chaired by the Honourable Herb Gray, P.C. M.P. The report was published by the
Government of Canada in 1972. It contained a number of proposals which were subsequently devel-
oped and incorporated into the Foreign Investment Review Act.
14. See M. JENKIN, THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY: INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE CANADIAN
FEDERATION 25-26 (1983). Jenkin explains:
Canada is geographically large, as well as socially and economically diverse. Since its
creation it has had an industrially developed centre which has been primarily reliant on the
domestic market, and a series of resource-or staples-producing regions on the periphery,
largely dependent on exports. As a result, different patterns of economic development and
interests have evolved, with provincial governments becoming the natural focus for those
interests. This has turned the issue of industrial strategy into one involving territorial-political
conflict ... support for one industry or one firm is seen as support for one region or province
rather than another.
Id.
15. See id. at 160. This factor has been summarized as follows:
The more elusive political problems of federal industrial strategy relate, as Richard French
has noted, to two problems: first, the political risks for a government when it proclaims goals
for which it can be held accountable; and second, an ingrained hostility in the upper reaches of
the federal bureaucracy to the concept of industrial strategy. French argues that most political
systems are averse to risk. Faced with a policy that has uncertain prospects, but which creates
high public expectations, politicians will lose their resolve without significant outside support
or pressure. The shrinking away from commitments to industrial strategy by the federal
government in the early 1970s make this clear. According to French, this withdrawal has been
compounded by a hostility to the more positive, or dirigiste, proposals for industrial strategy
centred in the Department of Finance and in senior levels of the IT&C [Federal Department of
Industry, Tade and Commerce].
Opposition was partly ideological and partly policy oriented; in the case of the Finance
Department, it was an objection to the interventionist nature of industrial-strategy proposals
which originated in the PCO [Privy Council Office] in the early 1970s. The Finance Depart-
ment, in keeping with its role and the chief exponent, until recently, of Keynesian economic
orthodoxy, preferred a mainly tax-based system which relied on the market and was largely
neutral in its effects on individual firms. IT&C, on the other hand, opposed interventionism
because the PCO's emphasis on a coherent and rational selection of priority sectors and firms
ran against its traditional policy making approach which was largely incrementalist and
designed to support industry evenly on a sectoral basis. This position also largely supported
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The lack of steady progress towards a national industrial policy is, of course,
not universally viewed with regret. 16 While the notion of an overall industrial
policy may not be alive and well and thriving, it would be premature to announce
the demise of industrial policy as an armory of related industrial strategies. In
November of 1982, some news releases suggested that the Government of Canada
shortly would move to unveil an industrial strategy that would target sectors of
the economy for support in expansion efforts. The automobile and aerospace
industries were said to be the targets of the new strategy. 17 The accounts indicated
that other sectors were also being looked at as possible targets, including the
petrochemical and forest products industries. A rail transportation strategy was
said to be in place, and work apparently was underway for a strategy for the
fishing and shipbuilding industries. 8 Other reports shortly after this indicated
that the government would also consider the adoption of a "high-tech" industrial
strategy before the end of 1982. Its possible key ingredients were to be richer tax
incentives for research and development by industry and a campaign to promote
technological changes to increase productivity. 19
the status quo in terms of both the location of industry and the process of industrial adjust-
ment.
The result of the opposition was an approach to industrial policy that was, in French's view,
incrementalist, centralist and continentalist. Incrementalist in its reluctance to pick particular
sectors or firms for special attention, centralist in its status quo approach to industrial location
which inevitably favoured the further concentration of industry in central Canada, and conti-
nentalist in its continued reliance on primary markets which de facto accepted Canada's heavy
dependence on U.S. trade and investment.
Id.
16. See, e.g., J.M. Bliss, The Evolution of Industrial Policies in Canada: An Historical Survey
31-32 (Feb. 23, 1982) (discussion paper presented for the Economic Council of Canada). Bliss's
judgment displays an attitude of what might be called melancholy relief:
With the possible exception of the brief period after World War II, when a broad consensus
existed among Canadian policy makers in the context of a particularly favourable historical
situation, there has been little unity or coherence to Canadian industrial policy. Policies have
sometimes been contradictory, sometimes complementary, sometimes simply confused.
Whether they have succeeded or failed, on balance, cannot be determined. Some specific
policies have certainly been disastrous failures. Perhaps it is time to ask whether the burden of
proof in evaluating a policy ought to remain on the side of finding failure. Which Canadian
industrial policies, if any, can be proven to have been clearly successful? Is Canadian pros-
perity a legacy of visionary, effective government economic management, or is it testimonial
to the triumph of Canadian resources and enterprise over political mismanagement? Perhaps
the net effect of Canadian industrial policies is to have made the Canadian people poorer than
they would have been had they been far less governed. It is unlikely, given the record of the
past, and given the plurality of interests composing modem Canada, that there can ever be a
single Canadian industrial policy.... In the realm of industrial policy, as in so many other
areas of our national life, we have to learn with diversity, ad hocery, and a certain amount of
disorder.
Id.
17. See Walkom, Lumley targets strategy plans for two sectors, Globe and Mail, Nov. 10, 1982, at
B I (Hon. Edward Lumley has been the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce since September
1982).
18. See id.
19. See Lewington, Cabinet may be shown hi-tech plan by year-end, Globe and Mail, Nov. 16,
1982, at BI.
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By March 1983, only four months later, the government apparently had de-
cided that the prospects for a large-scale industrial strategy were not promising.
According to press reports, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce indi-
cated that the government would restrict its involvement in industrial develop-
ment to situations where it was clear that the private sector wanted government
involvement.20 This, however, was not the end of the industrial strategy story:
press reports spoke of the prospect of a "secret, interventionist push by [the
Minister's] department in support of the private sector."21 Reports indicated that
the Minister was looking forward to receiving reports from industry and labor
task forces that he had set up to study the automotive, aerospace, oil, and
chemical industries. While the collection of sectoral strategies produced by these
task forces would be a kind of industrial strategy, the indication was that the
Minister was not planning to work on a more comprehensive and grand-scale
industrial strategy.2"
HI. FIRA AS A VEHICLE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY
While the debate on an overall industrial policy for Canada has followed its
wandering and fitful course since the early 1970s, the Foreign Investment Review
Act has remained in place and the number of investment cases decided under it
has steadily increased to well over 4,500 cases. The Act has frequently been the
subject of domestic controversy. It has also been the focus of considerable tension
with the United States. This tension reached its height in early to mid-1982, but
has since abated in very large degree. The reduction in tension clearly derives
from the efforts of the Canadian government to streamline the operations of
FIRA. The results of these efforts are described in a November 1982 report:
"Foreigners are finding it twice as fast and twice as easy to invest in Canada."
23
One year later, in its Annual Report on FIRA for 1982-83, the Agency released a
statement of the highlights which included the following comment: "Of the 984
applications decided in 1982-83, 94 percent were allowed and six percent were
disallowed." 24
At the time of the writing of this article, it appears that FIRA has reasonably
good prospects to continue operating at this relatively "benign" level, notwith-
standing the possibility of a change in the leadership of the Government of
Canada. In these circumstances, it is timely to consider the effectiveness of FIRA
as a vehicle for industrial policy. This assessment requires attention to three
different aspects of FIRA: the industrial policy or policies which it implements,
the process of implementation, and the role of the implementing authority.
20. See Walkom, Industrial Strategy dead, Lumley says, Globe and Mail, Mar. 30, 1983, at 8.
21. Silversides, Lumley adds new fuel to the flames on future of an industrial strategy, Globe and
Mail, Apr. 11, 1983, at BI.
22. See id.
23. FIRA's rejections are halved, proposals handled doubled, Globe and Mail, Nov. 9, 1982, at
B6.
24. Release No. F-40, supra note 10, at 30.
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A. The FIRA Industrial Policies
1. The Statutory Criteria
The Gray Report 5 contemplated the need for an industrial policy for Canada to
provide a proper basis for the making of decisions on individual cases under
FIRA. In view of the absence of any such overall policy, a question arises as to
how decision making under FIRA can proceed on any adequate basis. One
response to this may well be that the statutory criteria enshrined in the Act
provide a type of industrial policy. It may certainly be argued that any industrial
policy, whatever its specific terms, would aim to maximize the types of benefits
identified in the criteria, with the possible exception, to be considered later, of
Canadian ownership.
The statutory criteria, however, fall short of the usually assumed prerequisites
for an articulated industrial policy in a number of respects. They are relatively
general in their terms and, perhaps more importantly, there is no order of priority
set out for them. Related to this is the fact that there is no rule established for
making a determination when the result in a particular case is negative with
respect to one criterion and positive with respect to another, either as a general
matter or with respect to any specific industry or industry sector. The usual
reason advanced for this situation is that the FIRA review process is intended to
be, and is administered as, a case-by-case process, and in each case the positive
and negative factors are weighed within the context of the particular business and
its industry to determine whether, in the judgment of the Cabinet, there is a
prospective "net benefit."
The statutory criteria do not explicitly favor investment in any particular indus-
try or industry sector. It has been observed, however, that it is difficult to see any
"natural" application for the criteria in some investment areas, such as the rental
real estate business. As a practical matter, this has not prevented the government
from approving investments in areas with apparently only marginal potential for
significant benefit. Indeed, in the real estate area, the government has effectively
exempted smaller transactions and has indicated a general disposition to allow
larger investments, except where they would adversely affect the level of residen-
tial rents. 26
The use of the word "significant" in the Act's "significant benefit" test
27
might be thought to imply some additional, general test that the prospective
benefit must be of major proportion in comparison to the general level of eco-
nomic activity in Canada. Since the vast majority of the cases submitted for
review under the Act have a proportionally small impact, any interpretation of
this type would lead to the disallowance, on a massive scale, of foreign invest-
ment proposals. The government has never taken this approach to the test. On the
contrary, the approach has been that the proposed investment should be able to
25. See supra note 13.
26. See House of Commons Comm., Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade & Economic Affairs,
Issue No. 44, at 29 (May 6, 1975).
27. FIRA, supra note 1, at § 2.
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show some prospective net improvement over the existing situation that, in com-
parison with the existing situation, is "significant." For example, a prospective
increase in employment in the target business of, say, 15 percent over its existing
employment could well be considered "significant" even though that might mean
an addition of only three new employees in a business which had previously
employed 20 persons. This "incrementalist" approach to the significant benefit
test has been characteristic of the review process from the outset of the Act.
2. Canadianization
An important part of the rationale for FIRA has been the theory that foreign-
controlled firms in Canada have a relatively greater lack of responsiveness to
domestic Canadian economic concerns than Canadian-owned enterprises. For
this reason, the legislation focuses on foreign control as the jurisdictional basis
for the application of the Act's requirements. Moreover, the criteria for significant
benefit under the Act specifically address "the degree of participation by Canadi-
ans." 28 This has been taken, in the administration of the review process, to
include the degree of Canadian equity ownership and the degree of Canadian
management autonomy in the enterprise. Indeed, during one period of the admin-
istration of the Act-principally from 1980 to mid- 1982-undertakings by for-
eign investors to increase the degree of Canadian equity participation in the
acquired enterprise played a particularly important part in approvals under the
Act.
The need to undertake commitments of this type has been a source of irritation
to foreign investors; it has been alleviated only in part by the government's
willingness to allow such undertakings to be qualified by allowing the achieve-
ment of the desired level of Canadian participation over a period of three to five
years and conditioned upon the foreign investor receiving "fair value" for the
disposition of the equity interest in favor of Canadian investors. Since mid-1982,
as part of the comparative relaxation of the administration of the Act, less
importance has been placed by the government on receiving such Canadian
ownership undertakings. 29
Since the jurisdictional application of the Act is premised upon foreign con-
trol, the existence of the Act encourages greater Canadianization. Foreign inves-
tors who wish to avoid the uncertainties, the time, and the cost of the review
process have the alternative of structuring their investment to include a Canadian
partner or joint venturer so that the investment can be considered "Canadian-
controlled." In a number of cases, the foreign investor has agreed to take not
more than 49 percent of the equity in the corporate vehicle to be used for the
transactions, with the Canadian-controlled partner taking the 51 percent majority
position. Such an arrangement is ordinarily sufficient to avoid the application of
28. Id. at § 2(2)(b).
29. There are certain exceptions to this, particularly in the oil and gas industry. See infra text
accompanying notes 31-33.
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the Act, provided, of course, that there are no ancillary arrangements which
would erode the sole control constituted by the 51 percent holding.
30
There is little documentation on the extent to which enterprises carrying on
business in Canada or seeking to make acquisitions in Canada have resorted to
Canadianization in order to avoid FIRA and thereby enhance their tactical effec-
tiveness, but observers of the operation of the Act generally feel that there has
been an important incidence of Canadianization efforts which would not have
occurred in the absence of the Act.
3. Specific Industrial Policies
The Act makes it clear that specific government policies are to be taken into
account in the review process. 3 One of the most important of these is the
National Energy Program announced by the Government of Canada in October
1980, which states the government's objectives in the oil and gas industry. The
two principal objectives of the National Energy Program which FIRA has been
used to further are the achievement of 50 percent Canadian ownership of the
industry by 1990 and the enhancement of exploration and development in the
industry, particularly in Canadian frontier areas.32 There have been fewer FIRA
allowances in the oil and gas industry, presumably on account of the rigorous
application of these objectives. It appears that during the recent relaxation of
FIRA, oil and gas acquisitions have continued to present more exacting standards
to the foreign investor than investments in other areas of the Canadian
economy. 33
There are other areas where specific industrial policy concerns of the govern-
ment seem to affect the outcome of the FIRA review process, although these
policies are not as explicit as the National Energy Program. One of these areas is
what might be described as the "culture industry," including print and other
media. While there is no single enunciated statement on the application of FIRA
to acquisitions in this area, it is generally accepted that the thrust of Canadian
government policy is heavily against foreign ownership in the industry. Cases
decided under FIRA bear this out. 34
30. If there are arrangements which have the effect of sharing the control of the enterprise between
the foreign minority investor and the Canadian majority investor, the arrangement will be considered
to constitute "control by a group" in which one member of the group is foreign-controlled. Generally
speaking, such mixed-controlled ventures are reviewable under the Act. See FIRA, supra note 1, at §
8.
31. Id. at § 2(2)(e).
32. See Lacasse, Legal Issues Relating to the Canadian National Energy Program, 16 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 302-06 (1983).
33. In September 1982, the Government of Canada approved the Getty Oil acquisition of Canadian
Reserve. This major oil and gas acquisition was part of a larger acquisition by Getty of Reserve Oil
and Gas of Denver. The undertakings which Getty Oil gave to the government included commitments
to achieve 50 percent Canadian ownership of the combined Getty/Canadian Reserve enterprise within
five years and to carry out over $1 billion of exploration and development over a ten year period.
Foreign Inv. Review Agency, Gov't of Canada, Release No. F-66, at I (Sept. 13, 1982).
34. For example, the acquisition by Dow Jones & Company, Inc. of New York, of Irwin-Dorsey
Ltd. of Ontario was rejected twice, first in December of 1976 and subsequently in January of 1979. On
February 14, 1984 the Globe and Mail reported the rejection of two proposals out of a group of 22;
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Another area of this kind is the high-technology field. It appears that the
government is principally concerned with protecting the computer service indus-
try in Canada, both as a matter of enhancing high-technology development in the
country and ensuring the integrity of Canadian data bases.35 The Canadian gov-
ernment has provided critically important sponsorship of the development of
computer-related systems such as Telidon,3 6 and it is generally assumed that a
FIRA application that had the potential to erode the prospects for such systems
would have a very difficult time in the FIRA review process.
In some cases, industrial policy seems to be developed on an ad hoc basis by
the government in response to specific FIRA applications. One case that seems to
exemplify this type of development, and caused concern on this score, was the
Coca-Cola acquisition of the Canadian operations of Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries, Inc. as part of the takeover of Columbia in the United States. In that case, it
was reported that following the announcement of the proposed acquisition, the
Canadian Department of Communications launched efforts to block the acquisi-
tion, employing policy objectives that had not previously been enunciated. 37
Another area where the existence of the FIRA process brought to light policy
concerns of general application in an industry sector is the distribution business.
In cases where foreign manufacturing companies have sought to establish con-
trolled distributorships in Canada, they have frequently had the impression that
the government viewed distribution as an activity that should be left to Canadian-
controlled businesses unless the foreign investor demonstrated some special need
for foreign control or showed a prospect of significant upgrading of the Canadian
business, for example, through assembly or manufacturing activities in
Canada. 31
one of the rejected proposals was that of National Publishing Group Ltd. of Tulsa, Oklahoma, to
establish a business at Toronto to publish and distribute a monthly wedding guide. See 20 Foreign
plans allowed by Ottawa, Globe and Mail, Feb. 14, 1984, at B5.
35. See Hayden, FIRA's Effect on the Computer Industry, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA (P-
H, Canada) 2,034 (Oct. 31, 1983). Hayden comments:
Canada has over 265 computer service bureau businesses which are mostly Canadian-owned.
FIRA approval for foreign investors in this area is difficult to obtain. Canada has over 200
businesses which offer computer consulting service. Most of these are Canadian owned. It is
also difficult to get FIRA approval in this area. . . . The most frequently approved applica-
tions in the computer service area are those related to packaged software. . . . Applicants who
offer to manufacture computer hardware in Canada will be reasonably well received by the
Agency.
id.
36. Telidon is an interactive television-related communications system.
37. See Valpy, Legally Hollow, Globe and Mail, Sept. 18, 1982, at GI.
38. In July 1981, the Honourable Herb Gray, then the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce
advised William Brock, United States Trade Representative, that at that time the Government of
Canada had reviewed 225 investment proposals involving the establishment of importing and retailing
businesses and had allowed 200 of those proposals. Mr. Gray stated that "these facts certainly do not
support the contention that the Act is being used to block the establishment of U.S. or other goods
into Canada." Foreign Inv. Review Agency, Gov't of Canada, Release No. F-174, at 2, 3 (Aug. 4,
1981).
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B. The Review Process Under FIRA
1. The Limited Scope of the Process
The FIRA review process applies only to foreign-controlled companies; Cana-
dian-controlled enterprises are free to invest and expand as they wish without
applying to the Agency. This means that the potential of FIRA as a vehicle for the
implementation of an overall industrial policy is severely limited.
Even within the limited realm of foreign investment transactions, the scope of
the Act is restricted. It applies only to acquisitions of control and to expansions
into new and unrelated businesses. It does not apply to acquisitions of additional
ownership interests where the acquisition would not result in a change in con-
trol.39 In addition, it does not apply to an expansion by a foreign enterprise
already carrying on business in Canada into a line of activity related to its
existing business. For example, a proposal by a foreign-controlled company to
make major capital expenditures on new plant or other facilities in its existing
line of business would not be reviewable. 40 Consequently, a great deal of foreign
investment in Canada falls outside the ambit of the Act.
The Act does not cover other forms of foreign business investment or activity
in Canada that might be important to the Canadian economy. For example,
agreements between foreign and Canadian businesses for the licensing of tech-
nology are not subject to review under the Act. 4'
While the process is limited as described above, it is not limited so as to apply
only to transactions of major size or to transactions in sectors considered to be
especially sensitive. Transactions of any size are theoretically subject to review,
and the vast majority of the cases reviewed are comparatively small in terms of
the investment amounts involved and their potential impact. The burden which
this places on the government and investors alike has been alleviated consider-
ably by the Agency's adoption of "streamlining" measures, which have reduced
the paperwork and review time involved in these applications. Although these
expediting measures generally operate well, they do not entirely eliminate the
necessity of dealing with the Agency and that inevitably adds a complicating
factor to transactions, and can be a source of irritation to investors.
39. The FIRA provides in effect that an acquisition of more than 50 percent of the voting shares of
a corporation by a person who already had control in fact of the corporation at that time is not a
reviewable acquisition of control for purposes of the Act. See FIRA, supra note 1, at § 3(3)(d).
40. See id. at § 8(2). This section requires an application to be made in respect of a proposal to
establish a new business in Canada only where the new business would not be related to a business
already carried on in Canada at the time by the person proposing the new business. In the Throne
Speech in mid-April of 1980, the government stated that it would broaden the mandate of FIRA to
include "performance reviews of how large foreign firms are meeting the test of bringing significant
benefits to Canada." Gov't of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 32d Parl., 1st Sess., Apr. 14,
1980, at 6. The statement did not say what form this promised broadening of FIRA's mandate would
take. One possibility was that the government was considering eliminating the exemption for related
businesses in cases of major new capital projects. The government subsequently announced that it
would not proceed with this proposed reform of FIRA. See GOV'T OF CANADA, ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT FOR CANADA IN THE 1980s, at 13 (1981).
41. The Gray Report identified licensing and other contractual arrangements as a further type of
foreign "investment" which could be included in the scope of the review process. See R. FRENCH,
supra note 13, at 466.
CANADA 145
The application of the Act is essentially reactive; that is, the Act only comes
into play after a foreign investor has decided upon a proposed investment. The
Act does not establish any mechanism for the government or the Agency to seek
out foreign investors or foreign investment proposals which might yield the kinds
of benefits contemplated under the Act. On the other hand, nothing in the Act
would preclude the government from undertaking such an effort or from using
the Agency in that effort. The possibility of adapting or supplementing the
existing administration of the Act with such a "pro-active" effort to locate and
bring new foreign investment into Canada has been the subject of increasing
comment. 42 It also appears to be something which the government is actively
considering. At a conference of international business representatives in Davos,
Switzerland, the Commissioner of the Agency commented that the Agency pro-
poses to communicate with investors who have had previous dealings with the
Agency to explore with them whether they might consider developing new Cana-
dian investment proposals.
43
2. The Approval Format
The FIRA review process leads to only one of two results for the investor,
either allowance of the investment, or disallowance. There are no financial or
other incentives tied to the review process, although investors may independently
qualify for one of the various forms of assistance that may be available under
other government programs." In the minds of some investors, this inevitably
gives the process a "no-win" aspect. The best the investor can do is to get
approval to carry out the plan he originally had in mind. With less luck, the
42. See, e.g., Spence, FIRA: A Decade of Evolution, in FoREIGN INVESTMNT REVIEW LAW IN
CANADA 315, 340 (J. Spence & W. Rosenfeld eds. 1984). The author states:
By late 1982, it seemed timely to wonder whether FIRA's role could be expanded or supple-
mented to include a positive effort to seek out and encourage foreign direct investment in
Canada of the type that would be beneficial. While such efforts are no doubt engaged in by
various government departments, federally and provincially, a question could fairly be asked
as to whether these efforts could be coordinated as part of a foreign investment development
program in which FIRAs could plan an important and positive role. One year later, the
question remains outstanding. One alternative would be to give the Agency a mandate to
initiate efforts to seek foreign investors who could tap identifiable investment opportunities in
Canada in a manner beneficial to Canada.
Id.
43. See FIRA Head warms tone in pitch to executives, Globe and Mail, Feb. 4, 1984, at 1. The
report states in part as follows:
As his next step in taking the fear out of FIRA, Robert Richardson, Commissioner of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency, is considering getting in touch personally with investors
who were hassled under the old regime and asking them to try again. Mr. Richardson, who
has headed the Agency since the fall of 1982, is pushing the Canadian Government's softened
line on foreign investment at this gathering of businessmen and bankers.
Id.
44. During the 1980 election campaign, Mr. Trudeau, as leader of the Liberal Party, stated that
"FIRA will help provide financial assistance to Canadian companies that want to compete for foreign
takeovers or repatriate foreign ownership of assets." Trudeau Industry Plan: Play our energy card,
Toronto Star, Feb. 13, 1980, at AI0. The government subsequently decided not to proceed with this
proposal.
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investor can obtain approval, but at the cost of onerous commitments relating to
new investment, expenditures on research and development, increased Canadian
ownership, or other matters.
Since the review process operates at the time an investment proposal is initi-
ated without continuing financial or other support, the decision to allow the
investment inevitably must be made on the basis of estimates of the future
conduct of the investor. This future conduct may not be readily controllable. The
foreign investor may, in good faith, undertake to achieve certain levels of capital
expenditure and research and development expenditure in Canada on the assump-
tion that a targeted level of sales can be achieved. If market circumstances change
and the target becomes unattainable, however, the government may be able to do
very little. First, the undertakings of the investor may have been expressly condi-
tioned on achieving the target level. In that case, the government simply could
not enforce the undertaking. Even if the undertaking were not so conditioned, the
foreign investor would no doubt take the position that he cannot do the impossi-
ble, and government may have little recourse. The Act makes undertakings given
under the Act enforceable by a court, 45 but a court might well have difficulty
granting an enforcement order framed in positive terms. An order framed in
negative terms-enjoining the company from carrying on business until it can
comply with the undertaking-may do more damage to the Canadian economy
than allowing the business to continue at a greatly reduced performance level. So
far, the Agency has not taken any foreign investors to court to seek performance
orders with respect to their undertakings. It appears instead that the Agency has
negotiated new undertakings with the investors that address the changed eco-
nomic circumstances. This, of course, can be another source of irritation: the
prospect of renewed rounds of negotiation with the government into the indefinite
future.
3. Provincial Representations
When assessing a FIRA application, the government is required to take into
account "industrial and economic policy objectives enunciated by the govern-
ment or legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected." 46 In
practice, the Agency regularly consults with the province that will be signifi-
cantly affected by the proposed investment. The federal government, however,
does not consider itself bound to act in accordance with representations of the
provinces. This is not to say that the consultation process is a mere formality. On
the contrary, while provincial input will not necessarily determine the outcome of
any case, it can be a very significant factor. It appears such input is particularly
important when the province expresses a strong regional policy and there is no
offsetting, incompatible federal policy. For example, it is well known that the
Atlantic provinces of Canada generally welcome any additional foreign invest-
45. Section 21 of the Act provides that where a person has given a written undertaking in
connection with an allowed FIRA proposal and fails or refuses to comply with the undertaking, a
court may make an order directing the person to comply. FIRA, supra note 1, at § 21.
46. Id. at § 2(2)(e).
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ment in the region, and there is a related general impression that FIRA applica-
tions affecting the Atlantic region are seldom turned down. On the other hand, a
FIRA application in the oil and gas industry which has no potential to meet the
standards of the National Energy Program would not stand much chance of
approval, even with the most enthusiastic support from one or more of the
provincial governments in western Canada.
The Agency has been reluctant to become involved in any type of bidding war
between provinces for prospective new investment. Traditionally, a FIRA ap-
plication has included information as to the place where the investor proposes to
locate the business. The FIRA officials do not seek to encourage location in a
different province. Presumably, the reason for this policy is to prevent the
Agency from becoming a captive in inter-provincial competition for new invest-
ment. It will be interesting to see whether the Agency is able to maintain this
independent position if it launches upon a new initiative to seek out and encour-
age new foreign investment in Canada.
4. Lack of "Transparency"
The FIRA review process has been criticized by both foreign and domestic
observers for what is frequently called its lack of transparency. This criticism
refers to three features of the process. First, as described above, there are very
few specific criteria to determine significant benefit. Consequently, the process is
regarded as highly subjective and discretionary, and therefore lacking in a neces-
sary minimum level of predictability. Second, the process is an informal one in
which the investor only meets with representatives of the Agency. However, the
Agency receives information from a variety of sources other than the investor and
formulates a recommendation never seen by the investor and considered by a
deciding body, the Cabinet, before whom the investor never appears. A final
feature of the process that makes it susceptible to a criticism for lack of trans-
parency is that only selected information is published about individual cases. It is
therefore difficult for the public to formulate any clear view of the effectiveness
of the review process.
In view of the tortuous history of industrial policy in Canada, and its uncertain
status at the present time, it should not be surprising that the government has not
enunciated detailed guidelines as to what constitutes significant benefit. One
fairly typical expression of the government's view is the following comment
made in a letter from the Honorable Herb Gray, then Minister of Industry, Trade
and Commerce, to the Canadian Bar Association, responding to certain recom-
mendations made by the Association's committee on FIRA:
There may be some merit in the Committee's suggestion for the issuance of "guide-
lines on a regular industry sector basis to indicate the manner in which the Cabinet
or Review Agency is interpreting the significant benefit criteria in light of changing
economic conditions and government policy" but it appears to reflect an over-
simplified view of the economy and of the assessment process itself. Sector guide-
lines could not possibly deal with all of the many variables that come into play as
between different proposals, even within the same industry sector, e.g., state of a
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business that is being acquired, the impact on competition, the impact on tech-
nological advancement, etc. 
4 7
The suggestion that the government should seek to develop such industry
sector guidelines could well lead to some unintended results. An articulated
policy that satisfied all the various constituencies whose views would have to be
reflected in such a policy would likely be either very bland or very restricted;
certainly, an official "opening of the flood gates" to foreign investment through
highly permissive guidelines would be bound to reopen the political controversy
over economic nationalism in Canada. That controversy is never far from the
surface in Canadian politics; it has the potential to operate as a "wild card", and
seasoned politicians usually like to keep their distance from the game or to ensure
that they have control over it.
The controversy over the procedural informality of the process has abated to a
degree, presumably partly because the significant increase in the level of ap-
provals over the past year or so is a satisfactory proxy for the elimination of
perceived deficiencies in procedure. In addition, Agency officials are now as
forthcoming as possible, without breaching confidentiality, with the other rele-
vant information that they have on file. 48
The third part of the lack of transparency criticism, that the decisions on
individual cases are not well enough reported, tends to be embraced more enthu-
siastically by members of the press than by investors. Investors typically are
happy to have as little as possible disclosed about their investment plans and the
commitments that they have made in connection with those plans. Over the past
year, the government has generally divulged far less information about individual
cases than before. The Agency currently reports levels of committed benefits
only in aggregate terms and not on a per-transaction basis; this certainly preserves
investor confidentiality but does little to accommodate the concerns of those who
would like to have a public basis for the appraisal of the effectiveness of the Act
and the Agency in specific cases.
The procedural informality of the review process is undoubtedly related to
another factor: time and cost. It is at least arguable that the present process is as
"streamlined" as possible, and is far more cost-effective than a formal process
would be with its attendant formal submissions and public hearings.
C. The Deciding Authority
1. The Role of the Agency
As described earlier, the Agency formulates a draft recommendation on the
application for the Minister to consider. In formulating that recommendation, the
47. Foreign Inv. Review Agency, Gov't of Canada, Release No. F-13, at 9 (Mar. 2, 1982).
48. As for the criticism that the investor never gets to deal with the deciding authority, this is one of
many factors bearing on the question of the appropriate deciding authority. See infra text accompany-
ing note 49.
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Agency takes into account the information provided by the applicant about the
proposed investment and the industry in which it is to be made, information
supplied by sources such as government departments and interested provinces,
and interventions from other interested parties who learn of the transaction. The
Agency officers who formulate the draft recommendation have varied experience
in business and government. They carry out their responsibilities under the
direction of career public servants who must try to anticipate the likely outcome
of the Cabinet deliberation, based on past experience with FIRA cases and their
understanding of present government attitudes. The Agency does not disclose to
the investor either the contents of the recommendation or its substance. However,
discussion with Agency officials usually brings to light those areas of a proposal
where the Agency has continuing reservations about the acceptability of the
investor's plan. Such discussion usually also provides an indication as to any
other significant reservations the Agency may have regarding other matters such
as the impact of the investment on competition.
Formally, then, the Agency is not a deciding authority; indeed it is not even a
recommending authority since it is the Minister who makes the formal recom-
mendation to the Cabinet. In practice, however, the Agency's view as to the
correct disposition of the case is critical to the outcome. This is partly because
the vast majority of cases are small and do not warrant a call upon the limited
Cabinet time available for FIRA matters. Also, over the course of the past ten
years, Agency officials have developed quite an acute insight into the way the
Cabinet is likely to deal with FIRA matters.
2. The Role of the Cabinet
Most FIRA cases are decided by a committee of a few members of the Cabinet;
only the most significant cases in terms of their controversiality or their potential
impact ever get to the full Cabinet.
The Cabinet does not publish reasons for its decisions on FIRA matters. The
record of decision, published as an Order in Council of the Government of
Canada, simply identifies the investment proposal and records the determination
made by the Cabinet.
It strikes many people as amazing that the Cabinet should be, at least formally,
the decision-making authority on all FIRA cases-even, as the point is usually
put, "for the opening of a hot dog stand." It is interesting that the Gray Report
did not consider which authority should have responsibility for making final
decisions on the cases. There are at least two factors which seem to favor the
Cabinet as the natural place to locate the ultimate decision. The first is that each
case has the potential to raise government policy implications. Since these policy
implications have not necessarily been reduced to any statement of government
policy-indeed, they may not even have come into focus prior to the particular
case being decided-it makes sense to ensure an opportunity for direct Cabinet
input into each decision. Secondly, since provincial representations must be
taken into account in each case, the involvement of the Cabinet ensures that
representations made by Ministers at the provincial level will be received and
considered by Ministers at the federal level and not simply by officials. It is quite
150 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
possible that provincial governments would be disturbed if they were not able to
ensure that their representations would be heard at a ministerial level.
However, it is clear that there is a cost in Cabinet time in maintaining Cabinet
involvement in FIRA decisions. The fact of Cabinet involvement also imposes a
limitation on the amount of disclosure that can be made in the course of the
review process. Because of the principle of Cabinet solidarity, the Agency has
typically taken the position that it is not at liberty to divulge to the investor the
nature of the Minister's recommendation to the Cabinet.
From time to time it is suggested that the system could be improved by shifting
the ultimate decision-making authority from the Cabinet to a special tribunal,
designed along the lines of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunica-
tions Commission (CRTC). 49 If this were to be done, it would be necessary to
deal with the problem of ensuring effective government policy input to the
tribunal. In recent years, it has become more common for federal government
tribunals to receive and act in accordance with policy directives from the govern-
ment. It is generally supposed, however, that such directives will take the form of
principles of general application. One example is the existing directive as to the
permitted level of foreign ownership in communications companies under the
jurisdiction of the CRTC. It is by no means clear that the policy involvement of
the Cabinet in FIRA decisions could be appropriately limited to this type of
directive. If it became necessary to ensure that the Cabinet had an opportunity for
more specific policy input, this could result in Cabinet involvement on a case-by-
case basis, which is the present system. The difference would be that the Cabinet
might be seen to be at odds with the tribunal; that type of public dispute is usually
not attractive to politicians.
The creation of a tribunal for FIRA decisions would potentially address many
of the criticisms concerning lack of transparency in the process. The proceedings
of the tribunal could be designed so that all submissions, whether from the
investor, interested government departments, or interested third parties, would
have to be submitted and considered in public by the tribunal. It is not clear,
however, that any of the parties involved in the process would regard that degree
of publicity as acceptable; and any lesser degree of publicity could make the
process misleading and the results incomprehensible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether FIRA is an effective instrument for the maximization of the benefits
of foreign investment in Canada involves questions that mix fact and policy and
may admit of no final answer. On the one hand, proponents of the Act typically
argue that it provides an essential technique to ensure that investment proposals
49. Mr. Michael Wilson, the RTade and Commerce critic of the Progressive Conservative Party in
the House of Commons, is reported to be considering the tribunal idea as part of a number of changes
to FIRA which his party would endorse. See Fin. Post, Feb. 1, 1984, Magazine, at 43.
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that would be detrimental to Canada are not implemented and that investment
proposals with beneficial potential are carried out in a manner that realizes that
potential. Critics of the Act contend it intervenes in the competitive flow of
investment capital and is therefore detrimental to the interests of consumers.
They contend that the Act interjects government policy into matters that should
be governed exclusively by business imperatives. Thus, the benefits the Act
appears to elicit are largely illusory and unenforceable. Moreover, there is the
continuing problem of the tension that the Act introduces into Canada's dealings
with other countries, although those tensions seem, at least for the moment, to be
at a manageable level.
Any assessment of the effectiveness of the Act is bound also to address
domestic political considerations. Economic nationalism, as mentioned earlier, is
an ever-present factor in Canadian politics. From this perspective, FIRA can be
seen perhaps as a typically Canadian compromise: it does not make anyone
happy, but it makes administrable what would otherwise be an intractable politi-
cal issue. On this basis, one might conjecture that FIRA will continue in force,
not because it is the best way to deal with the dilemma of foreign investment, but
because all of the alternatives-no controls at all or inflexible across-the-board
legislation-are worse. This approach would suggest that the current direction in
the administration of the Act will likely continue: a "streamlining" of the process
so that transactions are dealt with quickly and the high rate of approval is main-
tained.
It would help investors and their advisors if the government could move from
its present practice of ad hoc decision making to enunciate some guidelines for
the process, even if those guidelines are confined to a limited range of sectors or
types of investment and are carefully framed in terms that are conditional or
provisional. To date, however, the administration of the Act does not provide any
hope for that kind of development. A high rate of allowance may continue to
serve as proxy for that type of evolution.
Since the existence of the Act has frequently been controversial and always has
the potential to be so, these comments, like all conjectures about the future
development of foreign investment review in Canada, are subject to the vagaries
of political change. While neither the Liberal Party nor the Progressive Conser-
vative Party in Canada seems disposed at the moment to adopt a policy of radical
change to FIRA, the possibility cannot be entirely discounted, particularly if
there is renewed opposition to the Act from the United States Government. 5 0
50. A fairly typical expression of the U.S. Government's concerns about FIRA is the following
statement made in September of 1982 by Mr. Richard J. Smith, Minister in the Embassy of the United
States in Ottawa:
While we have thus far been successful in resisting domestic pressures to engage in such
investment's screening in the United States we do not challenge Canada's right to do so if it
chooses. It is particular aspects of FIRA's operation that concern us, such as the delays, the
lack of transparency, the unwarranted intrusion into the merger activities of the U.S. parents
of Canadian companies. Our complaint to the general agreement on tariff and trade, for
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In the context of industrial policy, the larger question is whether FIRA pro-
vides a model that can be adopted for the formation or implementation of an
overall industrial policy for Canada. On occasion it has been suggested that the
jurisdiction of FIRA, or of a FIRA-type authority, should be enlarged to include
investment proposals by Canadian-controlled companies. The idea seems eccen-
tric-even wildly eccentric-in terms of both the traditional and the current
climate of business and political opinion in Canada. Whatever ideological sup-
port there is for FIRA, it would seem to derive from Canadian concerns about the
impact of foreign investment, and there is no similarly discernible ideological
consensus in favor of such controls on domestic investment proposals.
It could be argued that the National Energy Program of Canada provides a
more likely model for the implementation of an overall industrial policy for
Canada. This is because the program includes, as a central feature, major finan-
cial incentives for performance in the form of government grants. The experience
with the National Energy Program to date, however, manifests the risks inevitably
associated with such an effort. The costs of incentive programs have a potential to
leap beyond the bounds of their original conceptualization. And, in a free enter-
prise economy, the implementation of a directly interventionist government
scheme can provoke potent and continuing opposition. The government led by
Prime Minister Trudeau indicated that it did not propose to institute a similar
program in other industries. This was no doubt responsive to widespread investor
anxieties as well as government internal concerns about the cost of such
programs.
The government while it was led by Prime Minister Trudeau did not appear to
have any disposition to move in the direction of a broadly-based, integrated
industrial policy either employing a FIRA-type authority or a National Energy
Program style of government control plus incentives. In early 1984, the govern-
ment's agenda included, instead, a wide variety of measures, all of which have an
impact on the making and implementing of industrial policy. These included a
example, relates only to FIRA's performance requirements, which threaten to distort trade
patterns and undermine negotiated trade concessions.
FIRA's operations chill investors, U.S. envoy says, Globe and Mail, Sept. 8, 1982, at 7.
While more recent statements of U.S. government officials have not indicated that FIRA is a
priority concern, it should not be assumed that this condition will continue. It is not impossible that
U.S. criticism of FIRA could move in the direction of questioning whether FIRA should exist at all.
This could happen if the U.S. Government were to adopt a policy in support of a new "GATT for
investment" to protect the open flow of international investment around the world. See International
Investment: The Need for a New U.S. Policy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6(1981) (statement
of C. Fred Bergsten).
Recently proposed legislation on trade in services in the United States may have the potential to
move in this direction. M.J. Abrams has commented that trade in services legislation would expressly
authorize a U.S. response to restrictions such as those imposed under "various FIRA-related regula-
tions." He also comments that "the two major bills on the subject make explicit that retaliatory action
need not relate to the subject matter of the offending practice." See M.J. Abrams, Proposed Legisla-
tion on 'Tade in Services 3 (paper prepared for the Canadian Law Newsletter, a publication of the
Committee on Canadian Law, American Bar Association).
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reinvigoration of Canadian competition law,5' sectoral industrial policies, 2 sec-
toral free-trade policies with the United States, 3 and policies to deal with direct
government investment in critical sectors of the economy. 54 Tax policy is always
51. The Speech from the Throne in December 1983, setting forth the program of the Government
of Canada for the session of Parliament commencing at that time, included the following statement:
Following extensive and continuing consultations with the private sector and the provinces,
the government will introduce a new competition policy to bring market forces to bear in the
continuing fight against inflation. The legislation will modernize conspiracy, monopoly and
merger provisions, and promote the interests of consumers and small business through a freer
market place. Amendments will also facilitate consortia to compete abroad for export sales
and development projects.
Gov't of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 32d Parl., 2d Sess., Dec. 7, 1983, at 3 [hereinafter
cited as Throne Speech].
A press report on the subject states: "One of the few, key issues of dispute between the government
and the big business groups is believed to be the issue of pre-notification of mergers. The government
wants to be advised 21 days before the consummation of a merger so that, if necessary, it can be
undone." Lewington, Ottawa waters down proposed competition reforms, Globe and Mail, Jan. 17,
1984, at BI.
52. On the subject of sectoral industrial policies, the Throne Speech includes the following
remarks:
Sectoral collaboration is at the core of the Government's industrial policy. Three business-
labour task forces, on the automotive, aerospace and forestry industries, have now reported
and are receiving responses. Another task force on the petro-chemical industry is under
way ... Additional task forces are planned on information technology, private trading
houses, textiles and clothing, shipbuilding and a deep-sea fleet, and selected elements of the
service sector.
Throne Speech, supra note 51, at 3.
53. The Government of Canada published a paper in September, 1983 which according to reports,
espoused a deliberate effort to move toward closer economic integration with the United States via
free trade agreements in selected manufacturing sectors. In the Throne Speech, this subject was
addressed in the following way:
While seeking new markets in the Pacific Rim, Europe and the developing world, we must
continue to expand business and improve relations with our largest trading partner, the United
States. Sectoral trade agreements with the United States will be examined in such areas as
specialty steel products, urban transportation equipment, petrochemicals, textiles and
clothing.
Id. at 2-3. A subsequent press report comments that, of the possible area for such trade agreements,
"the most promising items, according to sources both in and outside government, appear to be
informatics (the services carried by telecommunications equipment) and associated equipment, and
agricultural machinery." Harrison, Canada-U.S. Trade: Friendlier Noises, Fin. Post, Feb. 4, 1984, at
22.
54. The Throne Speech includes the following statement: "The framework for the accountability
and control of federal Crown corporations will be improved and a bill will be introduced to confirm in
legislation the Canada Development Investment Corporation to better manage certain Crown assets."
Throne Speech, supra note 51, at 4. The Canada Development Investment Corporation (CDIC) has
responsibility for the Government of Canada's investment in Canada Development Corporation,
Canadair, de Havilland Aircraft, Eldorado Nuclear, Teleglobe, and Massey-Ferguson. The Chairman
of CDIC, Maurice F Strong, has described the role of CDIC as follows: "Our role is to ensure that
existing government investments in business are managed on a commercial basis in as business-like a
fashion as possible, and to help reduce the government's business investments, through divestment,
where this is feasible." Speech by Maurice F. Strong to Canadian Club of Toronto (Nov. 28, 1983).
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an instrument that can be called on, and announcements at the time indicated a
significant tax initiative in support of investment in scientific research and devel-
opment in Canada.55
All of these matters are, of course, items on a particular political agenda;
political agendas are always subject to change, through changes in political
leadership, governing parties, or otherwise.5 6 What remains constant are Can-
ada's special economic circumstances. With its extensive natural resources, a
developed industrial base, an educated populace, its proximity to the United
States, and its lack of membership in an established trading bloc, Canada is
bound to continually seek ways to position itself most effectively in the world
economy. This makes industrial policy, whether in the form of a grand overall
scheme or in the form of a variety of policy initiatives, an imperative of the
Canadian political economy. As part of that effort, Canadians will undoubtedly
seek ways to continue receiving foreign investment and to maximize the benefits
of that foreign investment for Canada.
55. The Throne Speech comments that "legislation will be introduced to confirm the tax incentives
for research and development announced in the April Recovery Budget." Throne Speech, supra note
51, at 3.
56. Subsequent to the writing of this paper, Prime Minister Trudeau resigned as leader of the
Liberal party and Prime Minister of Canada and was succeeded in both capacities by Prime Minister
John Tbmer, who took office at the beginning of July 1984. Both Mr. Turner and the leader of the
Progressive Conservative party, Mr. Brian Mulroney, have made various statements favoring restrict-
ing the role of foreign investment review in Canada. A federal election was held in Canada on
September 5, 1984. The Progressive Conservative party won the election and Mr. Mulroney became
Prime Minister of Canada. In December 1984, the government introduced Bill C-15, known as the
Investment Canada Act. The new Act was designed to repeal FIRA and established in its place a new
foreign investment review procedure, similar in many respects to FIRA, but applicable only to major
foreign takeovers and a limited range of new business establishments. The Act contains a different
test ("net benefit" instead of "significant benefit") for approval of foreign investment. The new Act
became law at the end of June 1985. See Bill C-15, 33rd Parl., 1st Sess., 33-34 Elizabeth II
(1984-85).
